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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : REPLY BRIEF 
vs - : 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE, : Case No. 20333 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Appellant is obliged to point out matters both fact 
and law, stated in respondents brief which are misleading? 
nonfactual> or both. 
Beginning in respondent's Satement of Facts he 
alleges appellant "misrepresents the fact with no support in 
the record and introduces material for the first time on 
appeal which was not a part of any record before the trial 
court." He then indicates what the "true facts" are. His 
first stated fact is that at the time of the divorce "the 
parties owned real property having a value of $780,200.00 
based on estimates and appraisals provided by Willia-m (R. 
85-91)." (Respondent's Brief P. 3-4-) Those "estimates and 
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appraisals" were pencilled notes of the defendant attached to 
his affidavit of income expenses and needs? etc. No 
appraisals as such are in the record. In arriving at the 
$7S0?000 respondent totally ignores the statements of debts 
relating to those properties also a part of those same 
estimates or exhibits. The indebtedness totals $54»2?800. 
(R. 88) Moreover those same exhibits demonstrate that the 
home was acquired in 1977? the Evanston property acquired in 
1973 and the Midvale property acquired in 1978 and that based 
on the acquisition costs as opposed to supposed market value 
appraisal estimates after attributing the respective 
indebtedness chargeable against each unit that there was a 
positive equity of $17?138 in the Evanston parcel? a negative 
balance in the Midvale property of $4?2^E and a value in the 
home of $10?450. The net value therefore as to the two 
rental units is $12?890 as opposed to the $10?450 in the home 
awarded to plaintiff (R. 89? 90 and 91). Plaintiff/ 
Respondent attempts to suggest with the isolated figure of 
$780?000 that the property settlement was outlandishly 
disproportionate. In fact that division was stipulated to by 
the parties openly as to who was to receive what property and 
who was to pay what debts. 
Respondent next cites the divorce decree claiming 
that the residence given to the p1aintiff/respondent had a 
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value of approximately "110,000" and cites the record at page 
100 and 101. There is no stated value in that reference in 
those paragraphs of the decree but only an itemization of the 
mortgages against the property together with the language 
directing the defendant/appelant to pay the first mortgage 
and the p1aintiff/respondent to pay the second mortgage. 
Going back, however, to the estimates earlier alluded to 
(furnished by the defendant) the real equity in that property 
was either the $10,^-50 noted above or $125,000 based on the 
defendant's estimate as to the fair market value. Perhaps 
respondent was rather relying on his client's resale of the 
residence for $110,000 as asserted in her Answers to 
Interrogatories (Addendum to Appellant's Brief, p. 
t^) (Respondent's ambivalence about those Answers to 
Interrogatories will be treated more fully hereinafter). The 
decree further provided in paragraph 8 (R. 117 and 118) that 
the defendant pay the plaintiff the additional sum of $5,000 
"as additional distribution of the parties' real property" 
within six months from the date of decree which in fact the 
defendant did pay and is acknowledged by receipt and partial 
satisfaction dated 27 April 1982 (R. 130). 
Repsondent then continues William (plaintiff/ 
appellant) was ordered to pay the first mortgage on the 
residence having a balance of approximately $52,800 and 
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continues Mthe decree specifically stated that this was a 
0EQ9§ElY §§iiI^H}§Di anc* that Rosemary (plaintiff/ 
respondent) would be entitled to only $1 per year as 
alimony" citing the record at page 118, That citation makes 
no such specific allegation that this was a "property 
settlement" but rather as the decree itself provides it was 
an assignment of debt just as the second mortgage debt on the 
residence was assigned to the plaintiff and other debts of 
the marriage as well as the outstanding indebtedness on the 
rental properties awarded to the defendant were respectively 
disposed of. Counsel for respondent thereafter continually 
refers to this payment of mortgage as a "property 
settlement," There is no language in the decree so 
characterizing it. 
Respondent then cites her Answers to 
Interrogatories as authority to assert that plaintiff/ 
respondent sold the family residence for a "small 
downpayment" and specifically states "the buyers did not 
assume the mortgage on the property and Rosemary 
(plaint iff/respondent) is still liable for those payments." 
Those answers are found in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief, 
pages 3-6? as follows: 
"Question ^(e): Was the said home conveyed to buyer by 
Uniform Real Estate Contract5 deed and mortgage or trust 
deed? 
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"Answer: Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
"Question M f ) : Was there any escrow account established for 
the payment of the underlying mortgages7 
"Answer: Yes. 
"Question 4(g): What arrangements were made with regard to 
those mortgages and payment therefore7 
"Answer: Escrow agent makes payment to Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan. CAt this point it should be observed that 
the first mortgage and second mortgage on the family 
residence were m favor of Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
as spelled out in the divorce decree. Paragraph 3 (R. 116)1 
"Question 4(i): What notice of sale did you give to the 
lending institutions holding the mortgages7 
"Answer: None. 
"Question 4(j): Who has made the payments on both mortgages 
from that date to the present. 
"Answer: Alder-Wallace, Inc., as escrow agent for Rosemary 
T. Siggard." 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the payments 
from the buyer of the property go directly to pay the 
mortgage payments through the escrow agent and that no notice 
of sale was furnished by plaintiff/respondent to the lending 
institution when she resold the home. While it is probably 
true that plamtiff/respondent is still signed on the 
original first and second mortgages on that property for that 
matter so also is the defendant/appellant. The truth of 
the matter is that p1aintiff/respondent's buyer has from the 
time of the purchase of the property, September 5, 1981, been 
the party actually making the payments and he does so because 
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he is obligated to do so. Defendant/appellant attached to 
his addendum a copy of the actual real estate contract 
between plaintiff/respondent and Mr. Jose N. Roco to further 
corroborate those Answers to Interrogatories and as noted in 
our intitial brief there is substantial language in that 
contract assuming the mortgages and holding the 
plaintiff/respondent harmless from those obligations. 
Plaint iff/respondent wishes to have those documents stricken 
because they never "became a part of the record" below and 
that is essentially appellant's point. We never have had an 
evidentiary hearing. Judge Frederick has never permitted us 
to produce that evidence to impeach the mere profers 
presented by counsel for plaintiff/respondent before 
Commissioner Peuler. What plaintiff/respondent succeeded in 
keeping out below he wishes to keep this Court from noticing 
on appeal. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this point to 
consider respondent's motion to strike (point 3 of 
respondent's brief) the affidavit of Sandra N. Peuler which 
he also claims was unsigned and outside the record. On that 
matter his memory is apparently short. The original of that 
affidavit is indeed a part of the record but not the record 
in the District Court but rather the record of pleadings in 
this Court attached to appellant's Motion for Summary 
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Disposition heretofore filed in this appeal. It is found as 
an exhibit or attachment to said Motion. Respondent's 
counsel further argues that the Peuler affidavit is unsigned 
and unacknowledged which with regard to the copy in 
appellant's Addendum is true. We accordingly attach as an 
Addendum to this Reply Brief a xerox copy of the original 
that is a part of the record before this Court showing it to 
be both signed and indeed acknowledged. 
Returning to respondent's statement of "true" facts 
he next asserts that his client took the downpayment received 
on the sale of the home in Holladay to purchase a condominium 
in St. George and cites her Answers to Interrogatories. A 
reference again to those Answers shows that she received 
$30,000 down from the sale of the home* the purchase price 
for the condominium was $79,000, and that plaintiff/ 
respondent paid fi^OOO down on the purchase of that St. 
George condominium. So contrary to her counsel's assertion 
that she used "the downpayment" to buy the St. George 
condominium she actually used one-thirtleth (1/30) of the 
downpayment on such purchase (addendum to appellant's brief 
pages 4-, 5 and 6 ) . 
Respondent next asserts that his client was 
"forced" to lose her condominium in St. George because of 
non-payment by appellant. Both parties agree that when 
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plaintiff/respondent sold the Holladay home and moved to St. 
George defendant/ appellant continued to pay her the sum of 
$600 a month as extra money by way of additional support (and 
not the $578 per month required by the decree to be applied 
on the first mortgage) through June of 1983 and that he then 
reduced the extra supplemental payment to $300 a month 
through November, 1983 (R. 116 and 237). In her Answers to 
Interrogatories plaintiff/respondent admits that she 
remarried hay 18, 1983 and moved to her new husband's home 
which was purchased at the time of the marriage (Addendum to 
appellant's brief? page 7 ) . She was then asked what efforts 
were made to refinance the contract on the sale of the home 
in Salt Lake to get her full equity out. She answered none. 
She was asked if any efforts were made to refinance the 
equity in the condominium, and again answered no. She was 
asked what was the status of the foreclosure on her St. 
George condominium and replied "none. Quit-claim deed was 
given to original seller, Nixon and Nixon, Inc." (Addendum 
to appellant's brief, 7 and 8 ) . In short, contrary to her 
counsel's assertion of being forced to sell she did in fact 
remarry, repurchase a new home, deed back to her condominium 
seller the condominium and made no efforts to do any 
refinancing of either the condominium or her contract on the 
Salt Lake home. In short, the claim that non-payment by 
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defendant/appellant caused the loss of the condominium simply 
is not true. 
Respondent then says "William's attorney did not 
say at any time in the hearing before Commissioner Peuler 
that he does not accept the Commissioner's recommendations or 
that he desired a further hearing before the District Court." 
He then quotes that part of the record before Commissioner 
Peuler in which she announces who the judge would be to 
consider any further hearing? to wit Judge Frederick, and 
makes reference to the Commissioner's own minute entry 
which says "Deft did not accept recommendation." (R. 2^ +1 and 
R. 137) By quoting those very items respondent is 
acknowledging that the Commissioner at least was aware and 
received communication from defense counsel that the 
recommendation was not accepted and the Commissioner 
indicated to counsel who the judge would be before whom 
further proceedings would be had. Such an announcement would 
be needless or superfluous if counsel had been silent or had 
assented to her recommendations. In sum therefore, even 
though the transcript of the hearing before Commissioner 
Peuler is incomplete on its face as earlier noted in our 
original brief such of the record as is available 
corroborates appellant's rather than respondent's position on 
this point. Moreover, the affidavit of Commissioner Peuler 
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would appear conclusive on the matter as follows: 
Such notice or communication of disagreement 
or nonconcurrence has never been required by 
Commissioner Peuler to be submitted in writing. 
Frequently the nonconcurrence was announced in 
open court at the time the recommended order was 
announced? i_n whj^ch case such D2D^20£yLL§0^§ y^yld 
k§ Qsii?^ i n the !uiQyt§ ?Q£LY. ZQL t t i § i d ^ l e^ §y^!2 § 
^i§§9L?§!!!§0i. °L D°Qt9.n^y!IIl?DE§ 9.U ^ !2§ £§L^ 5f the 
^§f§D^§0^ ID £he case of Wiscqmbe v^ _ Wiscombe was 
o^d? \IY. ^2^05? ! I n ° E § D 9.9yL^ §od 52. D2t?d o.u 
Q2!50]!i5ii5D?ii E§y l?£ l§ d}inyt§ §Dtcy I D tha t (D^ti§ii 
d§JL§d ^y9y§ i ?JL i ?? f t i § £°EY_ 2 f ^ t i i ^ t i i § §QD§*§d 
b§E§£o §^ Exh^ bijfc A_^  (Emphasis added)(Addendum to 
appellant's brief page 10) 
Finally? in his Statement of Facts section counsel for 
plaintiff/respondent says "William's attorney did not claim 
in those objections (referring to the objections to the 
judgment submitted to Judge Frederick) that he gave oral 
notice to the Court and Rosemary's attorney that he would not 
accept the Commissioner's recommendation and he made no such 
claim until appeal to the Supreme Court." (He cites the 
record pages 151 to 155 which is Defendant's Objections to 
CJudge Frederick's] Proposed Order.) Perhaps he did not read 
the following language on page 152: "The Record discloses 
that a Minute Entry Summary of the proferred evidence and 
proposed recommendations of Commissioner Peuler of August 9? 
1984? was in the file together with the Entry of the Notation 
tb§t it}§ yD^§E§lsD§^ £2yD§§I f?E El§iD^i££ did osi §£2§ei 2E 
consent to those recommendations* all on the face of the 
document." (Emphasis added)(R. 152) Indeed counsel for 
plaintiff/ appellant objected on the basis that he had 
refused to accept the Commissioner's recommendation ab initio 
and that refusal so appears on her minute entry. (Addendum 
to Appellant's Brief, P. 11, 22). 
Point 1. RESPONDENT'S POINT 1 MISCONSTRUES RULE 8(d) OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S RULES OF PRACTICE. 
In his point one, counsel for respondent imposes a 
requirement on Rule 8(d) of the Third District Court Rules 
that is simply not there. In this matter when argued in 
front of Judge Frederick, counsel for plaintiff/respondent 
contended that Rule 8(d) required that a Notice of Refusal to 
Consent to the Commissioner's Recommendation had to be in 
writing served on opposing counsel as has already been 
treated in appellent's original brief. When the Motion for 
Summary Disposition was submitted to this Court respondent's 
counsel retreated from that position and complained only that 
he had not received actual notice of the refusal. Now in his 
brief he is taking the new tack that he got no actual copy of 
the minute entry of Commissioner Peuler, therefore somehow 
was unaware of what happened in open court in front of Judge 
Peuler and therefore got no actual notice of plaintiff's 
counsel's refusal to consent to the Proposed Order until some 
fourteen days later when the Notice of the hearing in front 
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of Judge Frederick was sent to him. This superimposes on 
Rule 8(d) a requirement that written notice of the 
Commissioner's recommendation is required to be served on 
Counsel. Such an assertion flies directly in the face of 
Commissioner Peuler's own affidavit as to what the usage in 
her courtroom was both prior to and following the adoption of 
Rule 8(d) as detailed m our original brief. It also 
thoroughly impeaches respondent's counsel's assertions that 
the undersigned now admit no written notice was given and 
that we are now making claim for the first time on appeal of 
oral notification. Commissioner Peuler received oral 
notification in open court? that matter was raised in front 
of Judge Frederick in the objections to judgment (R. 152) 
and has been reiterated both in the Motion for Summary 
Disposition and in the original brief on appeal. 
Respondent's repeatedly stating that the 
"transcript" bears no record of the undersigned's refusal to 
accept the Commissioner's recommendation (when that 
"transcript" is obviously incomplete on its face) simply 
won't wash in view of Commissioner Peuler's affidavit saying 
that the undersigned did in fact so notify the Court in open 
court at the time. Moreover it is further controverted by 
the Commissioner's own minute entry. Finally? the only 
rational explanation as to why the Commissioner would 
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identify Judge Frederick as the judge to hear further 
proceedings would have to be grounded on a basis of 
nonconsent. There would need to be no notice to counsel as 
to whom the Judge was to be* if in fact her recommendations 
had been accepted. No wonder, of course, that counsel for 
respondent wished to have the Peuler affidavit stricken. No 
wonder as well that he tries to explain away the minute entry 
with the phrase "It is unknown why this notation is in the 
record"i but then volunteers? "it did not result from any 
statement in open court by William's attorney." (Respondent's 
Brief p. 13) and just baldly asserts no such statement was 
made in front of Rosemary or Rosemary's attorney. We don't 
fault respondent for his memory as to what did or didn't take 
place but we do affirmatively assert that it is not for him 
to claim that what is in the record didn't in fact happen. 
That goes beyond the simple matter of memory. With regard to 
the transcription of the tape there isn't just the issue of 
its being prematurely being "turned off'but also there are 
statements in that transcript that show that the transcriber 
was unable to determine what was being said and therefore 
repeatedly inserted the words (inaudible) or (unaudible) and 
we once again reassert that on its face therefore, a reading 
of the transcript shows it to be incomplete. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that Rule 8(d) of 
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the Rules of Practice provides that a party objecting to the 
recommendation of the Commissioner "shallj within five (5) 
days of entry_ of the Commissioner's recommendation? provide 
notice to the commissioner's office and opposing counsel that 
the recommended order is not acceptable." (Emphasis added) 
Rule 58A(c) provides that the judgment is "entered" 
when the same "is signed and filed." The aforesaid Minute 
Entry was filed? but never signed by Commissioner Peuler and 
therefore was never entered. Therefore? the five-day period 
never began to run? certainly not before appellant requested 
in writing a hearing before Judge Frederick and served a copy 
on respondent. 
The Rules of Practice do not supersede the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (see Rule 2.1 of Rules of Practice). 
By enacting the Rules of Practice? there was no intention? we 
believe? to deprive a litigant of any substantial right 
granted him by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
hearings? under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? a number 
of safeguards are built in to prevent just the very kind of 
problem that has given rise to this appeal. Further? under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? written orders? judgments 
and decrees must be served under Rule 2.9 of the Rules of 
Practice and litigants have a clear opportunity to know the 
exact text of the order being entered against them and are 
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given knowledge as to when an order will be entered. This 
was not observed in this case. 
Furthermore? in proceedings before the Court? 
litigants are granted ten days (not five) to file a motion 
for a new trial? to modify or amend a judgment or other 
related relief. The procedure before the Commissioner should 
not be more restrictive. To the extent procedure before the 
Commissioner is more restrictive or harsh than that which 
prevails before a judge it is invalid as being m opposition 
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? and furthermore is a 
result that was never intended? and the procedure before the 
Commissioner should not be interpreted to even bring about 
such a result in the first place. 
We respectfully submit that the procedure adopted 
for the use of a commissioner in the district courts was 
intended to simplify handling of domestic relations matters. 
It was not intended to deprive litigants of any of the rights 
afforded them under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? nor to 
become a trap to litigants. The Rules of Practice themselves 
provide that strict compliance can be waived in the 
discretion of the court to prevent manifest injustice. See 
Rule 15.5 of Rules of Practice. 
We respectfully submit that Commissioner Peuler has 
adopted a reasonable procedure for conducting her affairs as 
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set out in her Affidavit and that the defendant fully 
complied therewith. The plaintiff on the other hand is 
asking for an erroneous? but in any case very strict 
interpretation of said Rule 8(d)* and if it is to be 
"strictly" interpreted? then defendant is entitled to have 
the word "entry" "strictly" defined as noted above, and 
accordingly the Commissioner's Recommendations have never 
been "entered" within the meaning of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? and the five day period never did begin to run. 
Point 2. RESPONDENT'S POINT II MISSTATES THE IMPACT OF 
DISCOVERY FOLLOWING THE COMMISSIONER'S HEARING AS IT RELATES 
TO ACTUAL NOTICE. 
Respondent's attorney says in point two of his 
brief? "William's attorney does not claim that the Answers to 
Interrogatories contained any notice that he would not accept 
the recommendations of the Commissioner." (Respondent's 
Brief page 1^) Perhaps counsel meant to say that the 
Interrogatories themselves have nothing in their express 
verbiage saying this is notice of nonconcurrence. Otherwise 
the sentence is meaningless. In any event? it is clear 
that discovery itself would be fruitless if defendant/ 
appellant had consented to the Commissioner's 
recommendations? and the act of pursuing discovery itself 
constituted notice. 
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Nevertheless? respondent goes on to argue that the 
Interrogatories nare not part of the record and they should 
not be considered by this Court" (Respondent's Brief pages lb 
and 15). He cites no authority to claim discovery responses 
are not part of the court records nor does he quarrel with 
the fact that the appropriate certificates were filed with 
the District Court showing the Interrogatories had been 
served and the Answers had in turn been served (Addendum to 
Appellant's Brief pages El and 25). Respondent cites no law 
in making that remarkable statement and one wonders for what 
purposes the Answers to Interrogatories do form a part of the 
record since he cites those very Answers to Interrogatories 
in his Brief at pages b and 5. Are they a part of the record 
for his purposes but not for the appellant's? 
The assertion made by respondent's counsel that 
Answers to Interrogatories herein are "not part of the 
record" arises we suppose from the recent change in the Rules 
of Procedure that provide that counsel serve Requests for 
Admissions and Interrogatories and Answers thereto on parties 
and file only with the Clerk of the Court a certificate 
indicating such were served somehow now means technically 
they are not part of the "record." The absurdity of that 
argument? however, is manifest in the situation where if a 
Request for Admission is admitted or denied in documents 
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served on counsel the receiving party cannot rely thereon 
because somehow the original response has not been filed with 
the clerk and hence is not a part of the "record" and is 
therefore not an admitted fact or for that matter a denied 
fact. Indeed the Request for Admission is a meaningless 
gesture. By the same token Responses to Interrogatories 
would be equally meaningless and there would? of course? be 
no need for them to be executed? acknowledged or sworn to by 
appropriate corporate officers if addressed to such an entity 
or otherwise because none of the material found therein is 
chargeable against the party so responding since they ar& not 
technically part of the "record". It would make such answers 
equivalent to depositions and require some further procedural 
requirement that they have to be filed and "published" like 
depositions before becoming part of the record. Since there 
is nothing in the rules providing for publishing of Answers 
to Interrogatories or Responses to Requests for Admissions? 
counsel's statement has effectively wiped out the usefulness 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions as a discovery 
device. The undersigned maintains this Court will reject 
such a narrow interpretation. 
Counsel for respondent then makes the curious 
argument that since the Courts in domestic relations matters 
retain continuing jurisdiction? the mere filing of 
-19-
Interrogatories is no indication that a recommendation of a 
Commissioner is not accepted. It apparently makes no 
difference to him therefore that the clear import of all of 
the questions making up the body of those Interrogatories 
relates exclusively and solely to the facts involved with the 
matter on which the Commissioner has ruled. Curious it is 
that discovery pertaining to the Commissioner's ruling and 
the facts presented to her somehow must be construed as 
ongoing investigation for some future Order to Show Cause. 
Such an interpretation stretches credulity. 
Point 3. RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE IS UNWARRANTED 
Respondent's brief quarrels with the "unsigned 
affidavit" of Commissioner Peuler as referred to earlier m 
this brief. As noted above? the original signed affidavit 
is already a part of the record in this court and a copy is 
attached hereto, and does in fact reflect the appropriate 
usage and interpretation of Rule 8(d) of the Third District 
Court Rules of Practice and is therefore highly germane and 
ligitimately a matter for consideration by this Court. 
Moreover, the Real Estate Documents attached in the 
addendum of our principal brief were there for this Court's 
convenience and were corroborated by a recorded Notice of 
Contract. Respondent did not want the trial court to see the 
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contract of sale (Addendum pages 13-16) and does not want 
this Court to see the same, because it points out rather 
clearly that the buyer of respondent/defendant's Holladay 
home did in fact assume the mortgages payments and executed a 
hold harmless agreement with plaintiff/respondent 
indemnifying her in the payment of both mortgages. 
Admittedly that contract is not a part of the record below 
solely and only because Judge Frederick refused to permit 
appellant to go forward with evidence. It is placed as an 
addendum to the brief here to show this Court that a 
legitimate issue of fact going to the heart of this 
controversy could have and should have been allowed to be 
raised in the Court below. Of course that document 
completely discredits respondent's repeated assertions that 
his client alone is liable on that mortgage? so his 
reluctance to have it before this Court is understandable. 
The aforementioned Uniform Real Estate Contract is 
particularly pivotal in view of what Commissioner Peuler 
herself says regarding whether or not plaintiff/respondent 
had been relieved from paying the mortgage obligation: 
"THE COURT: I think that perhaps if she had sold 
the home outright and relieved herself of that mortgage 
9bij.gatj.cm5 I might be persuaded that the outcome may be 
different; but it is my belief that as long as she is 
obligated on these mortgage payments then he should 
continue to comply with the requirements of the divorce 
decree . . . " (Emphasis added)(R. 238 and E39). 
-El-
Point 4. JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER DOES NOT CONFORM TO 
COMMISSIONER PEULER'S RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Respondent indicates? and the record indeed discloses, 
after the hearing in front of Judge Frederick he ex parte 
filed an affidavit claiming $1,400 in attorney's fees and 
submitted an Order as to form to Commissioner Peuler, leaving 
the attorney's fees amount blank and asking the commissioner 
to fill m what she chose to award by way of an attorney's 
fee as indicated in his letter of October 15, filed with the 
Clerk of the court October 19, 1984, (R.146). What his 
argument neglects to say is that there is nothing in the 
transcript of the proceedings before Commissioner Peuler that 
shows attorney's fees were even alluded to by way of prefer, 
demand, or otherwise and they were not. Moreover there being 
no hearing in front of Judge Frederick on the issue of 
attorney's fees counsel is now proposing to suggest that this 
Court should affirm a decree based upon the Commissioner 
filling in the amount following the hearing in front of Judge 
Frederick based solely upon his self-serving affidavit filed 
after the hearing m front of Judge Frederick largely because 
he asked for $1,400 and only got $150. He is asking this 
Court to ratify his doing indirectly what he failed to do and 
probably wouldn't have succeeded m doing directly. 
Far more serious, however, in point 4, counsel for 
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respondent asserts that the Order is in conformity with the 
Commissioner's recommendations with regard to a purported 
mortgage on the Evanston property and cites a part of the 
Commissioner's holding in that regard which or\ its face 
indicated that the Commissioner, while leaning in the 
direction requested by Counsel for respondent, indicated she 
didn't have sufficient facts before her to modify the decree-
Commissioner Peuler stated as follows: "And if the plaintiff 
feels there is sufficient equity there to protect, I think at 
that point, she is probably going to have to come in and ask 
that the decree be modified." (R. E39) That statement by 
itself implies that the Commissioner anticipated further 
hearing either before herself or Judge Frederick. But the 
matter was broached again later by counsel for respondent as 
fo1 lows: 
"MR. NELSON: My only question, Your Honor, would 
be as to the mortgage. It's by his own refusal to obey 
the Courts degree Csicl that she's in the position she 
is m now. It seems to me that we shouldn't be having 
to ask the Court to modify the decree when he's the one 
who made it impossible to live by. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess the real problem that I 
have with that right now is that I don't know what the 
liability was on that rental property at the time the 
parties entered into this agreement? and I certainly 
don't know what the liability is now, so I don't know 
what changes it would be. 
MR. NELSON: You're absolutely right. I apologize 
for that. You're absolutely right. 
-S3-
THE COURT: And I think — well, what I was going 
to say, is that I think it's going to take some further 
action before the Court can make a determination. 
MR. NELSON: I think you're right." (R. 240) 
With regard to that substitute mortgage on the 
Evanston property the undersigned argued to the Commissioner 
that if indeed that substitute mortgage was to cover 
respondent's equity in her home and guarantee that the 
plaintiff/appellant pay the first mortgage on her home that 
with the sale of the home and the assuming of the mortgage 
thereon by her buyer there would no longer need to be 
security to guarantee payment of the mortgage since a third 
person had assumed it. (R. 236) The Commissioner, of 
course, did not accept that argument, did not choose to view 
the facts as appellant/defendant argued them, partly because 
she did not have the Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to 
above before her. 
At any event, for counsel to argue as he does at 
Point 4 that the Commissioner was prepared to recommend that 
a mortgage on the Evanston property justifying his putting 
such an express paragraph in the Order that he had Judge 
Frederick sign (paragraph 2, R. 148, 149) is simply not 
supported by the record of the proceedings in front of 
Commi ssioner Peuler. 
Respondent finally argued that the Commissioner's 
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ambivalence as we have just noted above was whether the 
property to be mortgaged was Evanston property or Midvale 
property but he cites nothing in the record to demonstrate 
that and indeed there is no discussion along those lines to 
be found. It is further significant, that in his letter of 
transmittal to Commissioner Peuler (R. 14-6) counsel for 
respondent does not point out that he has put in a new 
paragraph requiring the execution of a mortgage on Evanston 
property. He refers rather, only to his Affidavit for 
Attorney's Fees and a blank in the paragraph for her to fill 
in the dollar amount. In short he turns the language of the 
Commissioner's recommendation: "Defendant is obligated to do 
what the divorce decree required him to do." (R. 137) into 
"Defendant is hereby ordered to deliver to plaintiff a 
mortgage or trust deed on the real property awarded to 
defendant at 1201 Sage? Evanston, Wyoming, and the amount of 
the first mortgage on plaintiff's house, 4-612 Belmour Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as required by the original decree of 
divorce." And he does that in spite of the foregoing 
language of the Commissioner indicating her unwillingness so 
to do for lack of sufficient facts. 
Point 5. THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT CORRECT ON THE MERITS. 
Without reviewing again respondent's inaccurate 
account of the "true facts" which are not true at all (which 
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plaintiff purportedly summarizes in Point 5 ) ? the truth is 
this matter nev&r has been heard on the merits. We believe 
that the established facts show that the payments to which 
plaintiff was given a judgment by the lower court were in 
their nature alimony not property settlement. Nevertheless 
if any doubt exists on the true nature of the payment? 
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that 
quest ion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons together with those advanced 
in the original Brief of appellant the judgment of the 
District Court should be reversed, and the case should be 
remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits before 
the District Court. 
Respectfully submi tted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Respondent/ 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant J. William 
Wiscombe to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent, 1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101 this day of January, 19S5. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Sandra Peuler, having been duly sworn upon her oath, 
deposes and says: 
!•. That she is over the age of 21 years, competent and 
makes this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. That she is the Domestic Relations Commissioner for 
the Third Judicial District Court and was acting as such on the 
9th day of August, 1984. 
3. * That the usage in her courtroom, both before and 
since the adoption of Rules of Procedure for the Third District 
Court, and particularly as it relates to Rule 8(d), was and is 
that if a party in a domestic relations matter did not agree or 
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMISSIONER 
SANDRA PEULER 
Case No. 20333 
Addendum Page 1 
concur with the said Commissioner's recommended order, the party 
could so inform the Court at the time; or should such party wish 
additional time for deliberation before deciding, could do so at 
any time within five (5) days from the date of the hearing. Such 
notice or communication of disagreement or nonconcurrence has 
never been required by Commissioner Peuler to be submitted in 
writing. Frequently the nonconcurrence was announced in open 
court at the time the recommended order was announced, in which 
case such nonconcurrence would be noted in the minute entry for 
that date. Such a disagreement or nonconcurrence on the part of 
the defendant in the case of Wiscombe v. Wiscombe was made by 
counsel in open court and so noted on Commissioner Peuler1s minute 
entry in that matter dated August 9, 1984, copy of which is 
annexed hereto as Exhibit A. 
SANDRA PEULER, COMMISSIONER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /^/ — day of 
December, 1984. 
N 
i » * » \ > 
My Commission Expires: 
s*^u*lL 
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RULES OF PRACTICE 
RULE 2.1. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
These rules shall govern the practice and procedure in 
the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah 
in all matters not specifically covered by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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RULES OF PRACTICE 
RULE 2.9. WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS, AND DECREES 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, 
or within shorter time as the court may direct, file with 
the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity 
wi th the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or 
Orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five (5) days after 
service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature 
within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal. 
Addendum Page k 
RULES OF PRACTICE 
Rule 15,5 EXCEPTION 
(a) All Court rules of practice and administrative 
orders effecting procedure and practice in force and existing 
prior to the effective date of these rules are vacated. 
(b) Courts deeming it necessary to re-enact prior 
court rules or develop rules supplemental to these rules 
shall do so by administrative order in accordance with Rule 
11.1 and Rule 11.2. 
(c> Strict compliance with the foregoing rules may be 
waived by the court, in its discretion, in order to prevent 
manifest injustice. 
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